Welfare reform and labour market dynamics: a preliminary review of the literature by Heins, Elke
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare reform and labour market dynamics
Citation for published version:
Heins, E 2007, Welfare reform and labour market dynamics:  a preliminary review of the literature.
RECWOWE Publication, Dissemination and Dialogue Centre.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Publisher Rights Statement:
With permission. © Heins, E. (2007). Welfare reform and labour market dynamics: a preliminary review of the
literature. RECWOWE Publication, Dissemination and Dialogue Centre.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare reform and labour market dynamics:  
a preliminary review of the literature 
 
 
Strand 1: Working Paper II 
 
 
Elke Viebrock and Jochen Clasen 
University of Edinburgh 
26 September 2007 
2 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction....................................................................................................................2 
Welfare state reform and Labour market dynamics.......................................................4 
Unemployment compensation and unemployment........................................................5 
Institutional parameters..................................................................................................9 
Macro-level institutional effects ..................................................................................10 
Sociological and longitudinal analyses of welfare state programmes and labour market 
dynamics ......................................................................................................................12 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................16 
References....................................................................................................................17 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The notion of labour market dynamics has played a prominent role in recent years. 
This is due not least to the concept of transitional labour markets originally developed 
by Günther Schmid and his team at the WZB in Berlin (TLM, see e.g. Schmid and 
Reissert 1996, Schmid 1998 or chapters in Schmid and Gazier 2002). The TLM 
concept refers to the observation that the borderlines between gainful employment 
and other productive activities are becoming blurred as people transit increasingly 
between different employment statuses and between gainful employment and labour 
market inactivity over the life cycle such as unemployment, education, training, 
unpaid family work or retirement. Thus, TLM emphasises the dynamics of labour 
markets, which means focusing the analysis on flows rather than on stocks (see 
O’Reilly 2003, foreword by G. Schmid, p. xiv).  
 
Within the WZB labour market research programme, transitional labour markets are 
defined as institutional arrangements that enable individuals to move between 
different employment relationships in a coordinated way while retaining an adequate 
level of social protection and to combine paid and unpaid work. Transitional labour 
markets provide protection not only against unemployment but also against income 
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and employment risks associated with transitions and thus offer incentives to take 
such risks, e.g. moving from dependent into self-employment or from a full-time to a 
part-time job. The extension of unemployment insurance, turning it into a form of 
employment or working life insurance that insures or safeguards individuals against 
all risks to their earnings (not just unemployment), reduces those risks through 
preventive measures and increases their willingness to accept flexible employment 
relationships (Schmid 2004).  
 
The TLM concept has since become the focus of an international ‘thematic network’ 
of research organisations and academics (TLM.net) which is supported by the 
European Commission (http://www.siswo.uva.nl/tlm). Given the research and 
literature produced by the network, this report does not aim to review the literature 
linked to TLM. Instead, while recognising some overlap and common interests 
between TLM.net and RECWOWE, we take as our point of departure the interface 
between welfare states and the labour market. More concretely, in the context of the 
work produced by strand 1 within RECWOWE, this report focuses on the ‘long-term 
effects’ of welfare state programmes (particularly activation policies) in terms of 
labour market transitions. In other words, the preliminary review of literature 
presented here is specific to research into the impact of welfare state programmes 
(and changes thereof) on moves between employment, unemployment and inactivity. 
 
The literature on the effects of welfare state benefits on the level and duration of 
unemployment is a relatively well established theme in the academic literature. We 
have reviewed arguments from economic theory which generally assume that benefits 
prolong job search and unemployment spells and summarised the empirical evidence. 
Most of this research has been undertaken by economists. However, there is a 
growing body of sociological analyses on this subject matter too. Of particular 
interest, although not that numerous yet, are studies which adopt a longitudinal 
perspective and analyse the effect of welfare state reform, i.e. institutional change, on 
labour market dynamics. Given the overall remit of RECWOWE generally, and the 
interest in aspects such as long-term effects of activation policies as well as intended 
and unintended consequences of welfare state change in particular, this is a research 
area which we would like to review further. 
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Finally, the preliminary nature of this report should be noted. The aim was not to be 
comprehensive at this stage but to feed into one of the tasks of strand 1, i.e. the 
investigation of the (long-term) effects of activation policies, which will play a 
prominent role in RECWOWE’s second period (2008-2009). We consider the 
following therefore as the beginning of a review which can be extended further during 
the course of the work of strand 1 within RECWOWE. 
 
 
Welfare state reform and Labour market dynamics  
One element of RECWOWE’s remit generally, and strand 1 focus on labour market 
flexibility and social security in particular, is the impact of welfare state institutions 
on labour market participation. Narrowly understood and perhaps most prominently 
researched, this would apply to active labour market policies and their influence on 
preventing or at least dealing with unemployment. Welfare state programmes such as 
training, job search assistance and work experience schemes are designed to help 
unemployed persons, as well as other working age groups (lone parents, persons with 
disabilities) find a way back into employment via what is nowadays called individual 
levels of ‘employability’. Of course, there is a long history and ample literature on the 
effects, or lack thereof, of labour market programmes (for an overview, see Martin 
2000) which will not be reviewed here. 
 
Instead, with a focus not only on transitions between unemployment and employment, 
but between employment, unemployment and other states of non-employment, such 
as education, early retirement, care or inactivity more generally, we would like to ask 
whether and in which ways welfare state institutions affect labour market transitions. 
We are interested in transitions only in relation to (and influenced by) welfare state 
institutions and programmes. To some extent, such a focus has a long tradition, most 
prominently in relation to the effect of unemployment benefits on the incidence and 
length of unemployment spells (see below). More broadly, however, there has 
recently been a growing interest in the impact of welfare state institutions on labour 
market careers. Making use of longitudinal methods, panel data analyses show that 
economic conditions, but also policy changes, have indeed had significant effects on 
movements between inactivity, employment and unemployment. However, studies 
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which investigate these aspects in a dynamic and comparative perspective, and focus 
on the impact of welfare state reform, have yet to be conducted in any systematic 
fashion. If anything, the latter seems to be a promising field of research not least due 
to RECWOWE’s interest in the long-term (intended and unintended) effects of 
welfare reform generally and activation policies in particular.  
 
Unemployment compensation and unemployment  
Just as the category ‘unemployed’ is heterogeneous so are the categories ‘not-in-the-
labour-force’ and ‘employed’. Unemployment may comprise people who receive 
compensation and those who do not; those who are actively seeking work and those 
have given up job search because they are discouraged by the labour market situation 
or who have already secured a new job, and so on. Inactivity may include those who 
are sick or disabled; caring for children or other dependants; those who are engaged in 
other unpaid work; retired; on military service; or in education and training. 
Employment can mean employed or self-employed; working full-time or part-time, 
and having regular or marginal jobs. Regular jobs are usually full-time, relatively 
stable, covered by statutory employment protection, and part of the legal economy. 
They may offer some prospect of promotion and may involve a substantial element of 
training. Marginal, precarious, casual or irregular jobs lack one or more of these 
features. This distinction between regular and marginal jobs is also captured by the 
primary and secondary sector (or ‘bad jobs, good jobs’) in a dual labour market, with 
a crucial distinction in terms of the degree of worker protection. Regular and marginal 
jobs are likely to be associated with different patterns of transitions between labour 
market states. The probability of job termination decreases with the duration of job 
tenure, partly because some jobs are temporary by nature. Evidence also suggests that 
substantial moves out of unemployment are to temporary jobs, reflecting in part the 
practice of providing or subsidising temporary work through labour market 
programmes.  
 
Studies into the ‘disincentive effects’ of unemployment benefits, a preoccupation 
amongst labour market economists in particular, tend to ignore these complications. 
Instead, the central question has been whether unemployment benefits and other 
income transfer programmes might have become too generous, thereby fostering exit 
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from employment or prolong unemployment. This concern has been expressed by 
economists particularly since the rise in unemployment levels and growing state 
deficits in the mid 1970s. The advancement of econometric techniques (e.g. hazard 
functions, see Kiefer 1988) and the emergence of job search theory as a major 
framework for labour market analysis also contributed to the increased attention of 
this topic among economists (Holmlund 1998). Economic job search theory predicts 
that the duration of unemployment depends on the individual’s reservation wage 
which is influenced by unemployment compensation. Therefore increases in 
unemployment benefit replacement rates and extensions in benefit periods should lead 
to a reduction in job search effort and hence to longer unemployment durations. 
Typically economists have focused on the negative effects of high unemployment 
benefits on the labour market, causing the unemployed to be less willing to accept 
jobs and even inducing some workers to quit employment. However, job search 
theory offers a second complementary prediction about the effects of unemployment 
benefits on job search outcomes among unemployed workers: unemployment 
compensation should not only prolong unemployment spell duration but at the same 
time improve post-unemployment job quality (Gangl 2002a).  
 
Economists have identified and estimated the potential behavioural responses to 
diverse work disincentives implicit in some income transfer programmes (see 
Holmlund, 1998, for an overview of economic analyses of the effects of 
unemployment insurance). Based on changes in the Austrian unemployment benefit 
legislation Lalive et al (2006) find empirical evidence which is consistent with the 
predictions of job search theory. The effect of changes in replacement rates and 
benefit duration is stronger among older age groups because of two reasons. The first 
is that older workers receive fewer job offers because employers prefer to hire young 
or prime-age workers. The second reason is that older workers are close to retirement 
or have opportunities to become eligible for early retirement and therefore have a 
lower incentive to search employment because the net benefit of finding a job is 
small. As a consequence, a more generous unemployment insurance system may 
induce older workers to reduce their search efforts more strongly than prime-age 
workers.  
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While income transfer programmes such as unemployment compensation schemes 
may create welfare losses, income transfers may also increase efficiency, e.g., 
improved job-worker matches, improved worker health, and increased willingness to 
accept technological change or to bear risk. Danziger et al (1981) provide an early 
review of analyses which estimated labour supply effects of diverse income transfer 
programmes in the US. The econometric methods employed in such studies were 
diverse and their overall varied considerably. Moreover, important explanatory 
variables such as local labour market conditions remained absent in some studies and 
measured poorly in others. Findings were contradictory due to differences in data sets, 
regression techniques and the choice of variables. For example, while most studies 
suggest that labour supply and retirement decisions of the aged are negatively affected 
by Old Age and Survivors Insurance, the magnitude of this incentive is doubtful 
(Danziger et al 1981: 987).  
 
The same can be said for studies on the effect of unemployment insurance on the 
duration of unemployment. Due to methodological problems, it is difficult to draw 
precise conclusions about the overall labour supply impact. In general, although a 
positive relationship between unemployment insurance and duration of 
unemployment appears robust, the effects seem to be rather modest (Danziger et al 
1981: 992). One study considered most reliable (Moffitt and Nicholson 1982) 
indicates that a rise in the replacement ratio of 10 percentage points would increase 
the average duration of unemployment by about one week. Such estimates suggest 
that only relatively large benefit cuts could reduce unemployment by a substantial 
amount. In a somewhat dated but still seminal review, Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1991) cast doubts about the robustness of such findings due to the sensitivity of 
results to unrealistic assumptions made about benefit systems in theoretical models. 
Subsequent research, using micro data and demonstrating greater awareness of 
institutional details of unemployment benefit systems (mainly from the U.S. and the 
U.K. but increasingly also from other OECD countries) found only minor effects of 
benefit levels on benefit duration (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991: 1712). 
 
In any case, it is important to note that prolonged job search - which is enabled by 
extended unemployment benefits - may also improve job matching. Moreover, in an 
economy with involuntary unemployment not all of the labour supply would be 
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employed so the real effect on labour supply can only be guessed within a wide band 
around the different estimates. Danziger et al conclude that the research findings ‘are 
too varied, too uncertain, and themselves too colored with judgement to serve as more 
than a rough guide to policy choices’ (Danziger et al 1981: 1020).  
 
The policy implication of such theories is that the adequacy of benefit levels has to be 
traded off against their disincentive effect. Yet, this is a gross oversimplification 
according to Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) who claim that only a relatively small 
number of studies paid attention to the ‘real-world features of unemployment 
compensation’ (ibid. p. 1699) and that some institutional details have even been 
almost totally ignored. The emphasis in theoretical and empirical work has been on 
the effects of changes in the replacement rate rather than the different conditions for 
receipt of unemployment compensation. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind 
that not all workers receive unemployment benefits due to insufficient qualification 
periods, disqualifying conditions or means-testing. When such institutional features 
are taken into account, it becomes apparent that unemployment benefit may have also 
positive effects on the incentive to work. Specifying such conditions as well as 
calculating the existence of dual labour markets may lead to different conclusions 
from the standard economic models. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991, p. 1706) 
conclude that the effect of unemployment insurance may be reversed when account is 
taken of such aspects as the requirement for previous insured employment, 
disqualification for voluntary quitting, or of the restricted coverage of unemployment 
insurance. For example, a rise in the benefit level may encourage labour force 
participation, making regular employment more attractive than marginal jobs. In other 
words, unemployment compensation may influence the type of employment taken up 
by those leaving unemployment.  
 
Likewise Holmlund (1998) points to a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding 
the magnitudes of the adverse effects of unemployment insurance on unemployment 
duration. He claims that simply looking at changes in unemployment is not sufficient 
to gauge the welfare effects of unemployment insurance. For example, the nature of 
capital market imperfection plays a crucial role in the appropriate design of 
unemployment insurance policies. If workers can self-insure through saving and 
borrowing, the case for generous public unemployment insurance is weakened. 
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Similarly, within a household the job loss of one member can be offset through 
increased labour supply of another household member. The interactions of such forms 
of private insurance with public unemployment insurance need to be better 
understood (Holmlund, 1998: 138). 
 
Institutional parameters 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) criticise that econometric models tend not to 
specifically focus on the flow between employment and unemployment but consider 
inflows to unemployment from all labour market states. They also repeatedly 
emphasise that analyses of unemployment benefit systems need to take account of 
both the level of benefits as well as maximum entitlement periods. An exceptional 
study in that respect is that by Lalive et al (2006). They manage to take into account 
the separate effects of the benefit replacement rate and the potential benefit duration 
by taking advantage of a policy change introduced in 1989 by the Austrian 
government, which affected various unemployed workers differently: a first group 
experienced an increase in the replacement rate; a second group experienced an 
extension of the potential duration period; a third group experienced both a higher 
replacement rate and a longer duration period; finally, a fourth group experienced no 
change in the policy parameters. In line with the predictions of job search theory they 
find that unemployed workers react to the disincentives by an increase in 
unemployment duration and that costs due to behavioural responses are substantial. A 
similar quasi-experimental research design was employed by Bennmarker et al (2007) 
when two unemployment insurance reforms were introduced in Sweden in 2001 and 
2002. They studied the effect of these reforms on transitions from unemployment to 
employment. While the overall effect on the duration of unemployment was 
insignificant they found that the two reforms in conjunction have increased the 
expected duration of unemployment among men but have decreased the duration of 
unemployment among women. 
 
Estimates suggest that an increase in the potential duration of unemployment 
insurance by one week prolongs the mean unemployment spell by about 0.10-0.20 
weeks (studies by Moffitt and Nicholson 1982, Moffitt 1985, and Katz and Meyer 
1990). However, there seem to be significantly different patterns for different 
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transitions from unemployment to other labour market states. The most significant 
negative effects are those of benefit duration on the transition from unemployment to 
employment, of benefit level on the transition to training, and of both variables on exit 
to inactivity. For example, falling benefits levels relative to student grants may make 
full-time education more attractive (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991: 1713-14). 
Empirical evidence on the specific significance of the effect of unemployment benefit 
levels on the entry to unemployment is rather limited, but it does not appear that 
benefits have much effect on inflows into unemployment (ibid., p. 1715).  
 
Another relevant factor is the way in which benefits are administered. A person 
claiming unemployment benefit has to satisfy various conditions concerning the 
circumstances of entry to unemployment and to search for new employment. Policy 
makers may find the tightening of such conditions politically more acceptable than 
reducing benefit levels. However, time-series of disqualification statistics do not 
present very concrete evidence. Again, the distinction between different labour market 
transitions is important. While some claimants may increase their search activity and 
hence their chances of reemployment, others may simply leave the labour force 
completely. Moreover, the effect of administrative pressures and increased claim 
monitoring may be towards transitions to marginal jobs as there are typically more 
vacancies of this kind (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991: 1719). However, little is 
known about the effect of unemployment compensation on people leaving the labour 
force or about their taking up marginal jobs. The authors conclude that future research 
has to distinguish different labour market states and treat the institutional features of 
different forms of unemployment benefit.1 
 
Macro-level institutional effects 
Nickell (1997) tests the hypothesis that labour market rigidities and inflexibilities are 
the reason behind high unemployment levels in Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
He finds that four labour market features help sustain high unemployment rates: first, 
generous unemployment benefits that are unlimited in duration, combined with little 
pressure on the unemployed to obtain work and low levels of active labour market 
                                                 
1 More recent evidence suggests that there is a strong effect of the strictness with which the benefit 
system is operated, at given levels of benefits, on the duration of unemployment (Nickell et al. 2005). 
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policies. Second, high union density rates with collective bargaining but no co-
ordination between either union or employers in wage bargaining. Third, high overall 
taxes (payroll and consumption taxes) impinging on labour or a combination of high 
minimum wages for young people in connection with high payroll taxes. Finally, low 
educational standards at the bottom end of the labour market. In contrast, the 
following labour market rigidities do not appear to have serious implications for 
average unemployment levels: strict employment protection legislation and general 
legislation on labour market standards; generous levels of unemployment benefit if 
these are linked with pressure on the unemployed to take jobs, e.g. by fixing the 
duration of benefit or activation measures; high levels of unionisation, so long as they 
are offset by high levels of co-ordination in wage bargaining, particularly among 
employers (Nickell 1997: 72).  
 
In other words, not all so-called labour market rigidities are associated with high 
levels of unemployment in Europe. He also points out that the variation across 
European countries is larger than the variation between the European average and the 
U.S. or Japan. For example, rates of job turnover are no higher in North America than 
in Europe and neither are overall wages any more flexible, but it seems that U.S. 
workers are more mobile than are many Europeans both geographically and between 
jobs (Nickell 1997: 59). There also remains the problem of reverse causality of such 
simple cross-section correlations since generous unemployment benefits might have 
been introduced as a response to persistent levels of unemployment. Finally, Nickell 
raises the question why roughly the same labour market institutions which ‘generated’ 
low levels of unemployment until the 1970s should since then be held responsible for 
high unemployment rates (see also Blanchard and Wolfers 2000). One explanation he 
gives is that the institutions had a big impact on the way in which each of the different 
economies responded to the major adverse shocks of the 1970s and the way in which 
some of these responses persisted through the 1980s and 1990s (Nickell 1997: 66).  
 
In contrast to earlier findings (Nickell 1997) in a more recent study Nickell et al 
(2005) argue that the rise in unemployment across the OECD between the 1960s and 
the first half of the 1990s can be explained to a large extent by shifts in labour market 
institutions. Interactions between these institutions and shocks make no significant 
additional contribution to the understanding of OECD unemployment changes, but 
12 
strong employment protection legislation is a key factor in generating labour market 
inflexibility. A positive effect on unemployment levels is also exerted by employment 
taxes, but this is modified in economies with coordinated wage bargaining. In contrast 
to previous findings, benefit levels and benefit duration, their interaction, as well as 
increases in labour taxes seem to have an important impact on unemployment. By 
contrast, Nickell et al (2005) find no significant effect of union density on 
unemployment although they find a positive rate of change effect. This suggests that 
increasing union density rates exert a pressure on wages and raises unemployment. 
Yet this effect disappears when union density stabilises at the new higher density rate. 
There is strong evidence that the strictness with which the benefit system is operated, 
at given levels of benefit, is a very important determinant of unemployment duration. 
 
In sum, empirical evidence showed that unemployment insurance may exert adverse 
effects on the incentive for the unemployed to leave unemployment but these are 
typically small in magnitude and the underlying research methodologies are often 
weak. Other programme features than benefit levels seem to be more important as 
barriers for (re-)entering employment. Secondly, there is little ground for believing 
that much voluntary quitting is induced by the existence of unemployment insurance.2 
Unemployment insurance may even have positive effects on labour market 
participation and favours regular rather than marginal employment. Thirdly, other 
labour market institutions may exert stronger effects on unemployment rates. Finally, 
it is important to distinguish different effects on different types of workers (for 
example, old or young, in regular employment or marginal employment) and different 
labour market transitions. 
 
Sociological and longitudinal analyses of welfare state programmes and labour 
market dynamics 
Based on job search theory and its derivatives, many econometric studies, including 
those referred to above, concentrate on the disincentive effects of welfare state 
transfers and adopt a critical stance on the interaction between benefit provision and 
labour markets. While job search theory suggests that the prolonged unemployment 
                                                 
2 An exception is the case of temporary layoffs where it seems that there may be a significant impact on 
employers’ behaviour (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991). 
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duration might be offset by increases in post-unemployment job quality, empirical 
studies have slanted towards one side, namely the negative effects of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment duration. In contrast, within econometric analyses, 
relatively little regard has been paid to the effect of unemployment compensation on 
post-unemployment job quality. A few notable exceptions include Blau and Robins 
(1986) as well as Addison and Blackburn (2000), who report evidence of some small 
positive effects of unemployment insurance benefits on post-unemployment earnings 
and wages, while Belzil (1995; 2001) provides evidence of post-unemployment job 
stability.  
 
While studies on the relationship between welfare state policies and labour markets 
have regularly been conducted in economics on both the macro- and micro-level of 
individual workers, by and large the sociological literature has either ignored the issue 
or focused on the stratification effects of unemployment dynamics in terms of gender, 
race, class, the life-cycle or labour market sectors and segments or on the relation 
between unemployment and macro-economic cycles or longer-run structural changes 
(see Gangl 2002a for references). There are exceptions, of course, such as studies on 
the effects of family policy on female labour force participation (e.g. Stier et al 2001) 
and the edited volume by Gallie and Paugam (2000) is a seminal attempt to link 
welfare state regimes and unemployment dynamics.3 The contributions by Layte et al 
(2000) and Bernardi et al (2000) in particular find evidence of labour market 
regulation and employment protection affecting unemployment and job dynamics. 
However, Gangl (2002a) points out that the macro-comparative character of the 
chapters in the volume by Gallie and Paugam (2000) might be insufficient since it 
does not allow for more direct inferences about the causal effect of institutional 
differences. 
 
In this respect, Gangl’s (2002b) macro-sociological work based on longitudinal data 
analyses is pioneering as he addresses the causal effects of unemployment benefits on 
both unemployment duration and job quality. Based on discrete-time event history 
                                                 
3 A related topic is the relationship between welfare state regimes and systems of industrial relations 
which has recently become prominent under the heading of “varieties of capitalism” but which shall 
not be the focus of this state-of-the-art review. Another recently rediscovered topic is the relationship 
between generous welfare states and strict activation measures as exemplified by the Nordic welfare 
states. 

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analysis of US and German panel data from 1984-1995, he finds support for both 
types of benefit effects. The use of longitudinal micro-level data confirms the well-
known finding that labour market dynamics differ substantially between the two 
countries. In the study period of 1984 to 1995 unemployment duration among German 
workers well exceeded comparable US figures. More remarkably, however, Gangl 
finds significant differences in terms of post-unemployment job quality – measured 
on six different job quality measures including earnings loss, job duration and status 
mobility - in the two countries in line with the predictions of job search theory. 
Basically, workers covered by unemployment insurance tend to achieve better post-
unemployment job outcomes than comparable workers without unemployment 
insurance coverage. Tatsiramos (2006) has since found similar results in a 
longitudinal (hazard rate) analysis of ECHP data for eight EU countries. 
 
In other words, against some prolongation of unemployment spells, unemployment 
benefits effectively enable workers to maintain previously accumulated human capital 
by fostering adequate reemployment in terms of earning, occupations, or job duration. 
Thus, while most economic work only addresses the short-term direct effect of 
transfer payments on unemployment duration, Gangl (2002a) provides evidence that 
welfare state policies have indirect long-term effects in the sense of stabilising 
individual employment careers. Cross-national differences in labour market dynamics 
are thus assuming a much more prominent role in explaining cross-national 
differences in labour market dynamics than currently assumed in most stratification 
studies.  
 
However, while the results establish an important role of the presence and type of 
transfer income, Gangl (2002a; 2002b) acknowledges that they also point to the effect 
of other institutional and structural factors that are necessary to incorporate in a fuller 
account of why unemployment dynamics differ that much between the US and West 
Germany or European countries more generally. For instance, institutional differences 
in labour market regulation and employment protection seem to be crucial as more 
flexible labour markets have been shown to create higher levels of job turnover and 
hence higher levels of job opportunity also for the unemployed. Another factor to be 
considered is the role of institutional differences in education and training systems, as 
the high degree of skill specialisation through the dual system of vocational training 
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in Germany should lead to relatively strong worker interests in maintaining 
occupational continuity upon reemployment. Using ECHP and other panel data and 
covering further countries, such as Denmark, subsequent analyses by Gangl (2004a; 
2004b; 2005), confirm that ‘scar’ effects of unemployment (in terms of the probability 
of a return to employment, the quality and duration of subsequent jobs, etc) differ 
considerably across countries due to the impact of welfare state programmes and 
institutional characteristics, such as transfer and training programmes, employment 
protection or activation schemes. 
 
Equally making use of panel data analyses, DiPrete et al (2001) investigate the effects 
of institutional aspects in the form of labour market regulation on the structure of 
labour market dynamics, comparing French and Swedish workers on open-ended 
contracts with workers on fixed-term contracts in both countries. Explicitly 
addressing welfare state programmes (social insurance, employment protection) they 
are able to empirically test the labour market ‘insider-outsider’ theorem arguably 
producing long-term unemployment in continental welfare states and suggest 
replacing it with a flexible two-tier labour market model which, at least in France, is 
characterised by age-biased and education-biased labour market transition processes.  
 
Investigating the effect of welfare state structures on labour market dynamics the 
work by DiPrete et al (2001) is complementary to that by Stier et al (2001) on the 
effects of family policies on female careers, or by Gallie and Alm (2000), Layte et al 
(2000) or Bernardi et al (2000) which compares unemployment dynamics in different 
welfare states. Gallie and Alm (2000) found tentative evidence that unemployed 
workers in more generous Scandinavian welfare states seem to be less inclined to 
compromise on job features required upon reemployment. Also some results by Layte 
et al (2000) relating to the lower propensity of Swedish unemployed to enter low-skill 
occupations after unemployment spells point into this direction by indicating positive 
effects of generous welfare states on individual job histories.  
 
Finally, research into labour market transitions in a dynamic perspective and aiming 
to capture the intended and unintended effects of institutions before and after major 
reforms seems rather rare. There are a few explorative studies though. For example, 
using German and British panel data Clasen et al (2006) showed that the reform 
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which introduced the Jobseekers Allowance regime in the UK in 1996 had the effect 
of lowering the rate of transitions from employment into unemployment, but also 
increased labour market inactivity of middle-aged men (25-50). Comparing Germany 
and the USA, DiPrete and McManus (2000) showed that variations in welfare state 
policy (tax and transfers) alter opportunity structures and exert influences not only on 
labour market transitions but also family change and gender relations. In general, 
however, the comparative analysis of the effect not only of welfare state institutions 
but their variation (reform) on labour market transitions is both an area which is close 
to RECWOWE’s concern and a field which is yet to be researched in any systematic 
comparative fashion. 
 
Conclusion 
Addressing long-standing concerns by economists about the (generally negative) role 
of unemployment transfers on the propensity to enter and remain unemployed, the 
need to pay attention to institutional differences across countries and the application 
of longitudinal data analysis, recent analyses have provided important insights in the 
interactions between welfare state programme and labour market dynamics. However, 
encompassing comparative analyses in this field, covering more than a few countries 
and analysing the effects of various welfare state programmes, have yet to be 
approached in a more systematic fashion. Moreover, in general the impact of welfare 
state programmes has been assessed from a perspective which has kept institutional 
variables constant. Given the interest in welfare reform and the assumed role of 
activation policies and labour market oriented reform of major transfer programmes 
more generally, it would be highly interesting to study more systematically the effects 
of welfare reform, and activation policies in particular, on labour market careers. Such 
an endeavour would, potentially, address one of the core aspects of RECWOWE, i.e. 
the investigations into the intended and unintended labour effects of activation 
policies.4 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 In correspondence to this, a number of future task proposals have been suggested within the 
RECWOWE strand 1 group relating to aspects of activation policies. 
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